Curiously, the international community appears to be interested mainly in pursuing investigations into the violence of 1999 and not the widely documented human rights atrocities of the earlier period since the Indonesian occupation began in 1975. See 'Report of the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor' (A/54/726-S/2000/59). Similarly, the 'Report of the Commission to Investigate Violations of Human Rights' established by the Indonesian National Commission for Human Rights deals with the period from January 1999 to the immediate aftermath of the ballot. It is unclear why the genocidal policies of the Indonesians in the earlier period of the occupation should continue to attract immunity. This point was brought to my attention by students at Northeastern Law School during a panel discussion on East Timor in October 1999. In East Timor itself, however, the proposed 'Truth, Reception and Reconciliation Commission' is to have a mandate to create a record of human rights abuses since 1975. For discussions of early proposals to backdate investigations, see Hayner and van Zyl, supra note 1.
It is, by now, a familiar pattern: egregious human rights violations . . . an assertion of international authority . . . a solution of sorts . . . demands for those responsible for atrocities to be brought to account under international law. For East Timor -like Bosnia before it -the closing stages of its self-determination struggle are likely to be played out against the backdrop of formal or informal 'trials': of individuals at the hands of some newly established ad hoc tribunal 1 or truth and reconciliation commission; 2 of complicit states 3 at the bar of world opinion. East Timor shall have its independence, and the international community shall have its culprits. 4 Or so, one
A Formal Analysis of the Right of Self-Determination: Dispensing with Two Preliminary Objections
Before turning to my substantive arguments, it is perhaps necessary to make a pre-emptive strike on what I anticipate are two likely objections to any proposal to embark on a formal analysis of the East Timor Story in the light of the international law of self-determination. First, there could be the 'indeterminacy' objection. According to this -now standard -critique, the right of self-determination is simply one of the most normatively confused and indeterminate principles in the canon of international legal doctrine. 5 Moreover, as commentators have shown, 6 traditionally it was formal legal analysis that was deployed to deny, rather than endorse, the existence of a legal right of self-determination. 7 To adopt a formalist posture in favour of the right of self-determination may thus appear positively oxymoronic.
A second -perhaps more compelling -objection might be on the grounds of political redundancy. The recent history of East Timor is well known. 8 On 30 August 1999, in a United Nations-sponsored 'popular consultation', the people of East Timor voted overwhelmingly 9 to reject the Indonesian offer of 'special autonomy' in favour of a United Nations-supervised transition to independent statehood. From then on, events moved apace. On 15 September 1999, the Security Council authorised the establishment of a multinational force (INTERFET) with a mandate to restore peace 10 This was 'requested' by Indonesia on 12 September 1999 and authorized by Security Council Resolution 1264 (1999), 15 September 1999. Security Council Resolution 1264 is thus an interesting hybrid. In the preamble, the Security Council welcomes Indonesia's readiness to accept an 'international peacekeeping force', yet paragraph 3 makes clear that the establishment of the multinational force is more accurately characterized as a (non-consensual) Chapter VII peace-enforcement action rather than (consensual) peacekeeping. The Australian-led multinational force was deployed on 20 September 1999. It finally handed over to UNTAET peacekeeping troops on 22 February 2000. In November 1999, ECOSOC requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to prepare a comprehensive programme of technical cooperation in human rights focusing on capacitybuilding and reconciliation. and security in East Timor. 10 On 15 October 1999, the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly repealed the infamous law of July 1976 under which East Timor had been annexed, 11 paving the way for the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to assume control of the territory. 12 And by November 1999, the last of the Indonesian troops had, finally, left East Timor.
In short, is not the 'Question of East Timor' passé? 13 Self-determination has 'happened'. It is no longer interesting. To be sure, the actual process of exercising self-determination encountered some regrettable 'operational' difficulties.
14 But these were due to the unpredictable excesses of disgruntled militias and 'rogue' members of the Indonesian security forces. As such, they lie firmly beyond the remit of the international lawyer. Today, there are simply far more pressing and exciting issues to engage the Timor-minded legal scholar. It is the premise of this article, however, that neither the 'indeterminacy' nor the 'politically redundant' objection is well founded. First, by way of a formalist defence, it will be shown that, contrary to its populist characterization as excessively indeterminate, the right of self-determination has a discernible core content which provides a normative yardstick against which to measure the international community's treatment of East Timor's legal claim.
Secondly, it is submitted that, far from being passé, a formal analysis of the East Timor Story in the light of the international legal rules on self-determination is both timely and necessary. For more than 20 years, following in the pioneering footsteps of scholars such as Thomas Franck 16 and Roger Clark, 17 international lawyers 18 have brought the force of international legal norms to bear upon the 'Question of East Timor'. 19 This article aims to do the reverse: to bring the force of the East Timorese debacle to bear upon international law. In other words, I wish to resist the appeal of the imminent, cast a retrospective eye, and explore what, if anything, the unhappygenocidal 20 -story of East Timor has to tell us about the 'moral hygiene' 21 of the international law of self-determination.
Following on from the introduction, the argument will proceed in three parts. In Part 2, I will consider the legal basis for East Timor's right of self-determination and argue that this should be characterised as a case of decolonization. The applicable legal rules are thus readily identifiable as those that emerged during the decolonization practice of the United Nations. In Part 3, I will confront the 'indeterminacy objection' and argue that, contrary to conventional accounts, the right of selfdetermination has a discernible core content which confers on beneficiary peoples such as the East Timorese two distinct sets of entitlements: self-determination as process, and self-determination as substance. Finally, having established the basic legal framework, in Part 4, I will compare two moments of high-level institutional engagement with (the two aspects of) East Timor's self-determination entitlement: the case brought by Portugal against Australia before the International Court of Justice in 1995; and the United Nations-sponsored 'popular consultation' of August 1999. It will be argued that the institutional shift from the International Court of Justice to the UN was also characterized by a shift from formalism to pragmatism, and that For discussion of the background to the 'Act of Integration', see e.g. Clark, supra note 17; Taylor, supra note 23, at 73-74.
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Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports (1995) 103, paras 31 and 37. It should be noted that the Court restricts itself to affirming that 'for both parties the territory of East Timor remains a non-self-governing territory and its people has the right of self-determination' (emphasis added): ibid. The Court itself does not make an independent finding. 27 Ibid.
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The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on Namibia held that: 'The subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing territories as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations made the principle of self-determination applicable to all of them. exercise its right of self-determination would lead inexorably to the break up of the Indonesian State. 34 Finally, and perhaps more crucially for present purposes, it is only in the colonial context that there exists a sufficient level of international consensus on the rules governing the exercise of the right of self-determination to protect the East Timorese against the indeterminacy objection outlined earlier. Beyond colonialism, the right of self-determination is plagued by an excess of indeterminacy both in terms of scope and content. By contrast, the rules relating to the exercise of the right of self-determination in the colonial context are -as we shall see -relatively settled. Identifying colonialism as the proper basis for East Timorese self-determination is thus important because it precludes the argument that the right of self-determination is so indeterminate that it provides no meaningful, normative yardstick against which to measure the international community's treatment of the East Timorese claim.
The Content of East Timor's Right of Self-Determination
As observed by an international meeting of experts in 1989, the contemporary debate in international law is no longer about the existence of the right of self-determination but about its content. 35 The point appears to be amply borne out if we consider that, in contemporary political discourse, self-determination is variously invoked to mean: independent statehood, autonomy, negotiations, limited self-government, land rights, self-management, and democratic governance (to name but a few). For the East Timorese, however, it is unlikely that this caricature of the right of self-determination as meaning all things to all peoples bears scrutiny. While the post-colonial dialogue unquestionably labours under a high degree of normative confusion, a review of international practice in the decolonization period reveals that the rules relating to the exercise of self-determination by a non-self-governing territory -such as East Timor -are both determinate and discernible. In elucidating this content, it is useful to distinguish between two core sets of entitlements: self-determination as process, and self-determination as substance.
A Self-Determination as Process
If we consider the standard definition of self-determination in international law, it is clear that it is depicted as the right of a people to a particular process: the right of all peoples freely to 'determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development'. 36 Thus the most fundamental right conferred on a people by virtue of the right of self-determination is the right of a people freely to 37 See e.g. Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1975) 12, paras 55 and 59; and infra.
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General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) 1960. 39 Ibid, at para. 5. Its sister resolution, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) 1960, also implicitly favours independent statehood as an outcome. Thus, although it provides that selfdetermination can be achieved by three means -independent statehood, free association or integration -it is procedurally weighted in favour of independent statehood. The General Assembly requested an Advisory Opinion on the following two questions: 'I. Was Western Sahara (Río de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)? If the answer to the first question is in the negative, II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?' 44 For example, Judge Dillard famously stated that: 'It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people.' See Separate Opinion of Judge Dillard, at 122. determine the destiny of its territory. Its essence is free choice. 37 Early resolutions, such as the historic United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 38 which stressed objective outcomes (independent statehood) 39 rather than subjective process (free and genuine expression of the will of the people) 40 were thus hastily superseded. What is striking, however, about the international legal definition of selfdetermination is how little it tells us about its operational content. Self-determination is depicted as a right to a process -the right of a people freely to choose -yet questions abound as to the procedures to be adopted. What exactly amounts to a free choice? How is the 'free choice' to be ascertained? In the context of assessing the international community's treatment of the East Timorese self-determination entitlement, these questions take on a specific guise: does self-determination require a referendum to be held? If so, how widely must the self-determination options be framed? And must they include the option of independent statehood?
Of course, these questions are nothing new. It was precisely such problems of process that dogged United Nations debates over the decolonization of the Western Sahara in 1974-1975 and led the General Assembly to request an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice.
41 Indeed, it was the need to assist the General Assembly in determining the process of self-determination in the Western Sahara that was central to the ICJ's decision to comply with the request for an Advisory Opinion.
This point has long been neglected. According to the standard account, 42 the General Assembly's request for an Advisory Opinion on the legal status of the Western Sahara at the time of its colonization 43 presented the International Court of Justice with a potential stand-off between the historic rights of States on the one hand (Morocco and Mauritania) and a people's right to self-determination on the other (the Western Sahara). Indeed, the Opinion is much vaunted for its pithy pronouncements on the alleged triumph of peoples' rights over states' rights in this normative zero-sum game. 44 But a closer reading of the judgment reveals that, on the Court's own 45 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1975) 12, at para. 48. 46 Ibid, at para. 70.
Ibid. The Court's conclusion that it had 'not found ties of such a nature as might affect the application of Resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the people of the Territory' must be read in the light of these earlier findings that the right of self-determination was not prejudiced by the request for the Advisory Opinion. Ibid, at paras 162 and 70. 48 Ibid, at paras 71-73.
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See ibid, at para. 71. interpretation, what was at issue in the decolonization of the Western Sahara was not so much a choice between the historic rights of third states versus the self-determination of peoples but, rather, a choice as to the procedures to be adopted in the self-determination process. Ascertaining the existence of historic ties between Western Sahara, and Morocco and the Mauritanian entity was relevant only to the extent that such ties would inform -not supplant -that self-determination process. This becomes evident if we consider the fate of the Spanish objection that the Court should refuse the General Assembly's request for an Advisory Opinion on the grounds that it lacked object and purpose. Spain argued that, as the United Nations had already determined the method of decolonization applicable to the Western Sahara (a consultation of the indigenous population by means of a referendum), the questions posed by the General Assembly were irrelevant, and any answer by the Court would be to no practical effect.
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In dispensing with the Spanish objection, the Court agreed that the decolonization process to be accelerated in the Western Sahara (as envisaged by the General Assembly) was to be based on the right of self-determination: 'the right of the population of Western Sahara to determine their future political status by their own freely expressed will.' 46 Significantly, it also concluded that the right of selfdetermination was thus 'not affected' by the General Assembly's request for an Advisory Opinion, but, rather, constituted 'a basic assumption of the questions put to the Court'. 47 However, the Court nevertheless went on to reject Spanish claims that the application of the right of self-determination to the decolonization process in the Western Sahara rendered the two questions in the Advisory Opinion without object and purpose. 48 The right of self-determination, said the Court, leaves a 'measure of discretion' to the General Assembly as to the 'forms and procedures' by which it is to be realized. 49 'Various possibilities' exist with respect to 'consultations between the interested States' and the 'procedures and guarantees' required for ensuring the free expression of the will of a people. 50 The function of an Advisory Opinion on the nature of historic ties between the Western Sahara and Morocco and the Mauritanian entity would thus be to assist the General Assembly in determining the procedures to be adopted in the self-determination process.
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Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1975) 12, at para. 70. 53 Ibid, at para. 59. See also ibid, at para. 55: 'the application of the right of self-determination requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned.' 54 Ibid, at para. 71. 55 Ibid, at para. 55. Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1975) 12, at para. 57. 58 Ibid, at para. 59. The Court did not elaborate on the meaning of 'special circumstances', but in his Separate Opinion Vice-President Ammoun gave as a prime example of 'special circumstances' the 'legitimate struggle for liberation from foreign domination'. See Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun, at 99. For Judge Singh, 'the principle of self-determination could be dispensed with only if the free expression of the will of the people was found to be axiomatic in the sense that the result was known to be a foregone conclusion or that consultations had already taken place in some form or that special features of the case rendered it unnecessary'. Separate Opinion of Judge Singh, at 81.
For present purposes of elucidating the content of the right of self-determination under international law, two points bear emphasis here. First, in concluding that the decolonization process in the Western Sahara was to be based on 'the right of the population of Western Sahara to determine their future political status by their own freely expressed will', 52 it is clear that the Court conceived of the right of self-determination exclusively in terms of a right to a process. Thus, it famously defined the principle of self-determination as 'the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples'. 53 Similarly, the Separate Opinions reveal an overwhelming judicial consensus that it is the freely expressed will of the people that constitutes the 'basic pillar' of the right of self-determination.
Secondly, while the Advisory Opinion is unequivocal that the right of selfdetermination requires the freely expressed will of the people, it is less illuminating on the crucial question of how that free will is to be ascertained. Indeed, as we have seen, in dispensing with the Spanish objection, the Court made it clear that the question of how to realize the right of self-determination was to be left open as a matter within the discretion of the General Assembly.
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It is clear, however, that the Court did not intend the General Assembly's discretion to be unfettered. In the first place, any 'forms and procedures' adopted must be such as to ensure 'a free and genuine expression' 55 of the will of the people. Secondly, the Court expressly endorsed certain provisions of General Assembly Resolution 1541 56 -i.e., 'informed and democratic processes' -as giving effect to the 'essential feature' of the right of self-determination. 57 Finally, the Court expressly stipulated that 'consulting the inhabitants' was a 'requirement' of self-determination with which the General Assembly had dispensed only where 'a certain population did not constitute a "people" entitled to self-determination' or where it was deemed 'totally unnecessary, in view of special circumstances'.
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In short, taking the Opinion as a whole, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in the absence of special circumstances, the free choice of a people must be ascertained 'On the contrary, it may be suggested that self-determination is satisfied by a free choice not by a particular consequence of that choice or a particular method of exercising it.' Ibid, at 123. through 'informed and democratic processes' such as a referendum or a plebiscite. 59 Moreover, while Judge Dillard expressly rejected Spanish arguments that the right of self-determination necessarily requires the option of independent statehood, 60 surely all that this means is that what amounts to a 'free choice' is not to be universally predetermined but rather must be judged according to the particular political desires of the particular people. 61 Nonetheless, there is a substantial body of United Nations practice in the decolonization period that favours independent statehood as the preferred self-determination option. 62 And in the particular context of East Timor, where a liberation movement enjoying the support of the majority of its people had been engaged in a 25-year struggle for independent statehood, it seems incontrovertible that the test of 'free choice' could only be satisfied where that referendum or plebiscite offered independent statehood 'as a legal possibility'.
B Self-determination as Substance
From a self-determination perspective, it is worth emphasizing that in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, the ICJ was faced exclusively with questions over process: first, relating to decolonization (to be based on self-determination); and, secondly, self-determination (to be based on a free choice of the population of the Western 64 It is this collective and ancestral attachment to the land that is often deemed to distinguish 'peoples' from 'minorities', and self-determination from minority rights. See e.g. Brilmayer, 'Secession and SelfDetermination: A Territorial Interpretation', 16 Yale Journal of International Law (1991) 177, especially at 189. 65 This would include the right not to be expelled from the land and not to be demographically manipulated through, say, the implantation of settlers. This is expressly included in the standard definition of the right to self-determination. Sahara). It is hardly surprising then that the (soon-to-be-textbook) definitional legacy of the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion should also depict self-determination exclusively in terms of a process: the right of a people to a free choice over its political and territorial destiny.
Yet, whatever the Court's definitional emphasis on self-determination as process, it should be obvious that the right to a process does not exhaust the content of the right of self-determination under international law. To confer on a people a right of 'free choice' in the absence of more substantive entitlements -to territory, natural resources, etc. -would simply be meaningless. Clearly, the right of self-determination cannot be exercised in a substantive vacuum. This is both implicit and explicit in the law. For example, implicit in any recognition of a people's right to self-determination is recognition of the legitimacy of that people's claim to a particular territory and/or set of resources.
64 Despite its textbook characterization as part of human rights law, the law of self-determination has always been bound up more with notions of sovereignty and title to territory than what we traditionally consider to be 'human rights'. More explicitly, the various international instruments make specific provision for additional substantive entitlements beyond the basic right of a people to exercise a free choice. And, while its normative contours are yet to be definitively settled, the following can be deduced as a non-exhaustive list of the substantive entitlements conferred on a people by virtue of the law of self-determination in the decolonization context: (a) the right to exist -demographically and territorially -as a people; 65 (b) the right to territorial integrity; 66 (c) the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources; 67 (d) the right to cultural integrity and development; 68 and (e) the right to economic and social development. 
East Timor's Right of Self-Determination: Institutional Engagement
It has thus far been established that, far from being excessively indeterminate, the right of self-determination has a discernible core content which confers two distinct 70 On the relationship between process and substance pending the realization of self-determination, see Drew, 'The East Timor Popular Consultation: Self-Determination Denied', in Hedman, supra note 3, at 5-6. sets of entitlements: self-determination as process and self-determination as substance. Thus, as a colonial people, the East Timorese were entitled, not only to a particular process (one that embodied a free choice over their political and territorial destiny), but -pending that process -a number of additional substantive rights (e.g. the right to territorial integrity, demographic integrity, natural resources etc.).
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Now, usefully for pedagogical purposes -though not, as it turned out, for the East Timorese -both aspects of the East Timorese self-determination entitlement encountered high-level institutional engagement: self-determination as substance (natural resources) in the case brought by Portugal against Australia to the International Court of Justice in 1995; self-determination as process in the United Nations-sponsored 'popular consultation' of August 1999. In considering each of these institutional moments by turn, it will be shown that, contrary to popular perception, there was as much a failure to implement the legal rules on selfdetermination in the United Nations-run popular consultation as in the ill-fated Portuguese application to the International Court of Justice. From a self-determination perspective, an excavation of 'what-went-wrong' in relation to both aspects of the East Timorese self-determination entitlement -in these two distinct institutional settings -reveals deficiencies in the structure of the international legal order with ramifications for the law of peoples 71 that extend beyond the territorial -or moralboundaries of East Timor.
A Self-Determination as Substance: The International Court of Justice and the Case Concerning East Timor
The first moment of institutional engagement to be considered is a highly legalistic one - inter alia a breach both of its own rights as the Administering Power and the rights of the East Timorese people -namely, to self-determination and permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The outcome was as predictable 77 as it was disappointing. The case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 78 The Court held -implicitly applying the Monetary Gold doctrine 79 -that it could not entertain the case 'in the absence of the consent of Indonesia', as any determination as to the legality of Australia's conduct would require a prior determination regarding the conduct of a third party not before the Court -Indonesia. 80 The decision has been the subject of much subsequent discourse and criticism. 81 Elsewhere, 82 for example, it has been argued that the 'configuration' of the East Timor case was clearly distinguishable from that of Monetary Gold Removed from Rome and that the ICJ erred in departing from its earlier jurisprudence in the Phosphates Lands case. 83 There is no intention to re-engage in the jurisdictional niceties of the Monetary Gold debate here. Rather, it is my intention to revisit the case from a self-determination perspective -beyond the narrow, statist, jurisdictional framework of the judgment -with a view to assessing what, in its wider aspects, the case reveals about the state of the international law of peoples.
The Elevation of Self-Determination as Process Over Self-Determination as Substance
The first issue highlighted by the case, of concern to the self-determination enthusiast, is the tendency to elevate self-determination as process over self-determination as substance. Consider, for example, the Australian arguments on the merits. In response to the Portuguese claim that, by negotiating and concluding the Timor Gap Treaty, Australia had infringed the rights of the East Timorese to self-determination, Australia argued that its conclusion and implementation did not:
hinder any act of self-determination of the people of East Timor . . . Whatever the choice made, the conclusion of the Treaty does not prevent the exercise at some later date of the right of the 84 Australian Counter Memorial, para. 374. Australia further argued that 'a State can only breach the obligation to respect the right of a people to self-determination if its conduct prevents or hinders the exercise of the people of a non-self-governing territory of their right freely to determine their political status'. Ibid, at para. 375. In other words, as exploiting oil resources presented no obvious impediment to the process of exercising a future free choice, Australia had breached none of its international duties in relation to East Timor's right of self-determination.
This argument is clearly misconceived. It portrays self-determination as no more than a one-off right of a people to participate in a process -a free, political choiceand ignores its core content of substantive entitlements (in this instance, the right of the Timorese to their oil). As Higgins argued in the oral pleadings, the effect of the Australian argument would be to empty the right of self-determination of any meaningful content. 85 Clearly, once it is recognized that self-determination entails substantive entitlements beyond the basic right to exercise a free choice, arguments that rely on such an artificial separation of process from substance are rendered logically untenable. Now, it could, of course, be countered that the Australian arguments tell us more about the litigation strategy of a particular respondent state than they do about any general trend in the international practice relating to the law of peoples. A wider review of state practice, however, reveals that the tendency to see self-determination as process as exhaustive of the legal content of the right of self-determination is confined neither to Australian courtroom posturing nor to East Timor. For example, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which strike at the very core of the Palestinian self-determination entitlement -territory, resources, demography -are routinely debated in institutional fora without any recourse to the law on self-determination. Instead, Israeli settlement activity has been variously characterized as contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention, 86 individual human rights 87 and the all-important peace process. It should be stressed at the outset that here I am using the terms 'substantive' and 'procedural' to distinguish substantive legal principle from procedural rights such as locus standi. This is not to be confused with my earlier characterization of the content of the right of self-determination as comprising two distinct elements: self-determination as process and self-determination as substance. I am grateful to Thomas Franck for pointing out the potential for terminological confusion here. self-determination has been conceptually stripped of its core entitlements to territory and resources, it becomes possible -for states, institutions and commentators alike -to assert both the inalienable, jus cogens character of the Palestinian right to self-determination, and declare the future of Israeli settlements as a matter for political negotiation;
89 to affirm the primacy of the right of self-determination, including the option of a state, and envisage a future for Israeli settlements on the West Bank. 90 Viewed in this contemporary light, how then as international lawyers do we respond to the Australian argument that the East Timorese right of self-determination emerged unscathed from the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty dedicated to the exploration and exploitation of East Timorese oil? Do we dismiss it as the courtroom strategy of a creative litigation team charged with representing a miscreant state? Or do we acknowledge that it reflects a more general trend in contemporary practice that unduly and selectively elevates self-determination as process over self-determination as substance, with deleterious consequences for the territory and resources of peoples from East Timor to the West Bank?
The Elevation of the Substantive Rights of Peoples over the Procedural Rights of Peoples
A second issue highlighted by the East Timor case concerns the relationship between the substantive rights of peoples and procedural rights of access (for peoples). 91 As noted earlier, the decision to dismiss the East Timor case on jurisdictional grounds has drawn criticism from many quarters. Christine Chinkin, for example, has argued, rightly, that the outcome of the case reveals an inherent structural bias in the international law system that favours procedural requirements over substantive principles -i.e. the procedural rights of absent third states over the substantive rights of peoples.
92 I want to take this analysis one step further and argue that from a self-determination perspective the case highlights a second structural bias in the international system: the elevation of substantive rights of peoples over procedural rights of peoples. Thus, while on a normative level, the right of self-determination has been declared by the International Court of Justice to be an obligation erga omnes, 93 99 demonstrates the limitations of litigating violations of peoples' rights through the prism of a human rights convention dedicated solely to the protection of the individual. On the standard account, the omission of a substantive provision on peoples' rights in early human rights instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights, has been remedied in later, third generation provisions such as the pivotal Article 1 -on self-determination of peoples -in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 100 Yet, the ill-fated attempts of representatives of indigenous peoples -the Grand Captain of the Mikmaq 101 and the Chief of the Lubicom Lake Band 102 -to bring claims against Canada under the Optional Protocol in respect of alleged violations of Article 1, remind us that the absence of an effective procedural mechanism for peoples to enforce the substantive right of self-determination is as much a feature of (third generation) human rights instruments 103 as of the (statist) International Court of Justice.
Alternatively, if responsibility for the procedural exclusion of peoples from international fora lies as much with our human rights present as with our statist past, perhaps we seek comfort in the prospect of an inevitably more people-inclusive future. On this reasoning, just as the substantive law of self-determination of peoples made its pilgrim's progress from political postulate to legal super-norm, 104 so too, with time, our international legal structures can be reformed to accommodate, procedurally, the claims of peoples. All we need is more -and better -law. 105 In 108 Could not the procedure of the African Commission be mobilized in support of a more general reform project?
Yet the critical scholarship of Nathaniel Berman teaches us to treat with caution the view of history as the inexorable march of legal progress. 109 In nationalist claims in international law that has survived ostensible 'progress' at both doctrinal and institutional levels: from minority rights, to peoples' rights; and from the paternalistic League of Nations, to the more 'enlightened' United Nations?
B Self-Determination as Process: The United Nations and the August 1999 Popular Consultation
The second institutional encounter I wish to consider is between East Timor's right to self-determination as process, and the United Nations-sponsored popular consultation of August 1999. 117 This may seem a strange choice of moment for critical scrutiny. If the encounter with the International Court of Justice was widely hailed as a disappointment, the popular consultation has been generally celebrated as the implementation of East Timor's long overdue right of self-determination. 118 On this, now standard, account the image of the East Timorese turning out in their droves to vote at United Nations polling stations in the face of threats from marauding militias 119 and Indonesian security forces bears testimony to the tenacity, not only of the East Timorese people, but of the international community faced with a suppression of the 'irrepressible' 120 right of self-determination. Yet for the self-determination formalist, the United Nations chapter of the East Timor Story is as troubling as its judicial counterpart. Questions abound. Why did the East Timorese require to be tenacious? Why were there 'marauding militias' and illegally occupying Indonesian security forces? In the era of the much-vaunted right of democratic governance 121 are not votes -especially United Nations-sponsored ones -supposed to be conducted in an atmosphere which is 'free and fair'? And given the presence of marauding militias and the Indonesian army, why did the United Nations deploy a civilian mission and not, for example, a military peace-keeping force?
The Background to the New York Accords
For international lawyers, the background to the August 1999 popular consultation should be well known. Since July 1983, 122 the good offices function of the United Nations Secretary-General had been deployed -to little avail -to assist Portugal and Indonesia to find an 'acceptable solution' to the Question of East Timor.
With the fall of General Suharto in Indonesia in May 1998, 123 negotiations intensified, 124 and in October 1998 the United Nations Secretary-General presented Indonesia and Portugal with a detailed draft constitutional framework for 'wideranging autonomy' in East Timor within the Republic of Indonesia. 125 Dispute over the autonomy plan centred less on the constitutional details than on whether East Timor's autonomy within Indonesia would constitute a final status (the Indonesian position) or an interim status pending a future act of self-determination by the East Timorese people (the Portuguese and East Timor leadership position). 126 The deadlock was resolved when -in an astonishing turnaround -on 27 January 1999, President Habibie announced that, if the people of East Timor declined the Indonesian offer of autonomy, Indonesia would be prepared to 'let East Timor go'.
127 It was this Habibie-led 128 volte face in Indonesian policy that paved the way for the conclusion of the historic New York Accords of 5 May 1999 between Portugal, Indonesia and the United Nations. 129 
The Structure of the New York Accords
Hailed by the United Nations Secretary-General as providing an historic opportunity for a 'just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor', 130 the New York Accords comprised three separate agreements. First, the General Agreement, 131 between Portugal and Indonesia, set forth the lynchpin principle: to request the United Nations Secretary-General to conduct a 'popular consultation' to ascertain whether the East Timorese people would accept or reject a constitutional framework for autonomy 132 within the Republic of Indonesia. To assist in this task, the Secretary-General was requested to establish an 'appropriate' United Nations Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET). 133 UNAMET was duly established by the Security Council on 11 June 1999. 134 The two supplementary agreements were tripartite -between Portugal, Indonesia and the United Nations -and dealt with the modalities for the popular consultation 'as well as for the general maintenance of law and order rests with the appropriate Indonesian security authorities. The absolute neutrality of the TNI [the Indonesian armed forces] and the Indonesian Police is essential in this regard.' Article 3 of the General Agreement, supra note 11, provided that: 'The Government of Indonesia will be responsible for maintaining peace and security in East Timor in order to ensure that the popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side' (emphasis added). Part G of the Modalities Agreement provided that 'the Indonesian authorities will ensure a secure environment for a free and fair popular consultation and will be responsible for the security of the United Nations personnel'. 140 Kennedy, supra note 21.
(the 'Modalities Agreement' 135 ) and the security arrangements (the 'Security Agreement' 136 ). The Modalities Agreement regulated such operational issues as the date of the ballot, the question to be put to the voters, voter entitlement, the timetable for the consultation process and so forth. 137 The Security Agreement crucially laid down a second lynchpin principle: that a 'secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimidation is a prerequisite for the holding of a fair and free ballot'. 138 Curiously, however, given their penchant for human rights abuses against the East Timorese, responsibility for ensuring the security environment was assigned, not to the United Nations, but to the 'appropriate' Indonesian security authorities. 140 -from legal formalism to institutional pragmatism. This becomes clear if we contest two standard assumptions that underpin discussion/analysis of the popular consultation and the violence that erupted in the wake of the announcement of the pro-independence results on 3 September 1999: first, that the popular consultation amounted to an exercise of the right of self-determination in accordance with the rules of international law; secondly, that the violence of September/October was aberrational and arose only in violation -rather than as a predictable consequence -of the New York Accords.
The New York Accords and the Right to Free Choice
We have seen that the 'essential feature' of self-determination as process is the right of a people to exercise a free choice. Thus, in order to be certified 'self-determinationcompliant' it must be shown that the New York Accords met the test of providing the people of East Timor with a true free choice as required by international law. And, while the precise meaning of 'free choice' is not expressly defined, it seems obvious that in order to be meaningful the designation 'free' must relate to both the range of choices offered and the conditions under which the choice was to be exercised.
(a) The range of choices: the ballot question
The question of the range of choices has been touched on earlier.
We have seen that General Assembly Resolution 1541 141 provides for three weighted options: independent statehood, free association, or integration with an independent state. The 1970 Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations 142 reiterates these three options and adds a fourth: 'or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people'.
143 By contrast, on any reasonable interpretation, the question put to the East Timorese people seems unduly circumscribed and weighted in favour of one particular option: autonomy. As provided by the Modalities Agreement, 144 the question put to the East Timorese voters on 30 August 1999 was: Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia? ACCEPT OR Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia? REJECT Thus, rather than present the East Timorese with a range of positive choices in neutral terms -say, integration with Indonesia, autonomy within Indonesia or independent statehood -the ballot question effectively offered a single choiceautonomy -on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Independent statehood was not offered as a positive option in its own right, but rather put in a cameo appearance as 'East Timor's separation from Indonesia', and as a negative consequence of rejecting 'special autonomy'.
But perhaps it will be objected that this line of argument is excessively formalistic. It cannot seriously be suggested that the East Timorese were unaware of the true self-determination options on offer: the Republic of Indonesia (integration) v. the Republic of East Timor (independence). UNAMET ran a faultless electoral educational programme 145 and the East Timorese themselves clearly grasped the point and voted in their droves. Yet, as international lawyers, how do we view the United Nations Secretary-General's decision to sign up to an agreement where a 'popular consultation' on 'special autonomy' displaced the traditional 'referendum' on 'self- 146 In her study of the inter-war plebiscites, Sarah Wambaugh draws a distinction between 'popular consultations' and the 'regular plebiscite'. See S. 150 Report of the Secretary-General, The Question of East Timor, S/1999/513, supra note 11, para. 6.
UNAMET was also mandated to monitor 'the fairness of the political environment' and to ensure 'the freedom of all political and other non-governmental organizations to carry out their activities'. Security Council Resolution 1246 (1999) 11 June 1999, para. 4.
determination ', 146 and where the positive desire for independent statehood of the vast majority of East Timorese was expressed in the negative language of rejection? Are we pragmatic in the face of realpolitik? Do we point out that the actual wording of the ballot question isn't what is important, that for Indonesia a 'popular consultation' was the only politically palatable option, and that in any event it all came right in the end? Or do we at least acknowledge that self-determination is about process, not outcomes, and that in signing up to the New York Accords the United Nations departed from its own decolonization practice, which, as we have seen, favours independent statehood as a self-determination option?
(b) The conditions for the choice: the security environment
But even if we accept that, while the language may have been disappointing, the ballot question put to the East Timorese on 30 August 1999 nonetheless offered a range of political options sufficient to constitute a 'free choice' under international law (though we would have to agree that those East Timorese who favoured the status quo -full integration without autonomy -were effectively disenfranchised) the New York Accords manifestly failed at the second free choice hurdle: the conditions under which that choice was to be exercised.
It is axiomatic that the exercise of a free choice through a referendum or a plebiscite requires conditions conducive to a fair and free vote. 147 And, prima facie, this is recognized by the New York Accords. As we have seen, Article 1 of the Security Agreement provided that the prerequisite for holding a 'fair and free ballot' was a 'secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimidation'. 148 The task of vouchsafing that secure environment fell to the United Nations Secretary-General. Thus Article 3 of the Security Agreement provided that, prior to the start of registration of voters, the Secretary-General shall 'ascertain, based on the objective evaluation of the United Nations mission, that the necessary security situation exists for the peaceful implementation of the consultation process'. 149 Guidance as to what exactly would constitute 'the necessary security situation' was provided in the accompanying Secretary-General's report: the bringing of armed civilian groups under strict control and the prompt arrest and prosecution of those who incite or threaten to use violence, a ban on rallies by armed groups while ensuring the freedom of association and expression of all political forces and tendencies, the redeployment of Indonesian military forces and the immediate institution of a process of laying down of arms by all armed groups to be completed well in advance of the holding of the ballot. 157 The Secretary-General made explicit the dilemma: 'The prospect of achieving greater security through delaying the process or indeed halting it had to be weighed carefully against the risk of depriving the people of East Timor of the historic opportunity afforded by the Agreements. It was by no means certain that should the timetable shift by too great a margin the consultation would be held at all.' 'Question of East Timor, Progress Report', supra note 119, at para. 24. 158 Drew, supra note 70.
The ballot was originally scheduled for Sunday 8 August 1999. 151 However, on 22 June, following reports of widespread intimidation and violence against proindependence supporters by pro-integration militias, the Secretary-General rightly determined that the 'necessary security situation' did not exist and postponed the start of the registration process for three weeks.
152 Indonesia and Portugal agreed to a two-week postponement of the ballot.
153 On 14 July 1999, following reports of further militia violence and intimidation, including a series of attacks against UNAMET convoys and personnel, the Secretary-General again determined that he was unable to attest to the necessary security situation. 154 But this time, 'undeterred by the intimidation', he decided that the registration process should nevertheless begin. 155 Finally, on 28 July 1999, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the date of the consultation had been postponed to 30 August 1999. 156 No subsequent determination that the 'necessary security situation' existed was ever made.
But if, for the Secretary-General, the thorny political question 157 in the lead-up to the ballot was whether the security situation on the ground measured up to Article 1 of the Security Agreement (and, if not, whether to go ahead anyway), for the self-determination formalist the question is whether the security arrangements in the Accords measured up to what is required by international law. In other words, did the terms of the New York Accords provide for conditions conducive to an exercise of a free choice? And it is my contention, as argued in advance of the ballot, 158 Accords' injunction that there be an environment 'devoid of intimidation' 159 was always going to be thwarted, not only by the external situation on the ground -the marauding militias, the Indonesian military -but also by two failings integral to the Agreements.
First, there was no obligation on Indonesia to withdraw 160 -or even to redeployits military forces in the lead-up to the ballot. Although Indonesian troop redeployment was listed by the Secretary-General as one of the main elements of the 'necessary security situation' 161 any corresponding treaty provision in the New York Accords is conspicuous only by its absence. That the 'neutralization' of a territory -including the removal of the armed forces of the former power -is an essential condition for a free vote has long been established in international practice -from the League of Nations supervised plebiscites of the inter-war period 162 to the more recent decolonization practice of the United Nations. As regards the latter, for example, the UN settlement plan for Namibia 163 provided for a reduction in South African Defence Forces (SADF) to 1,500 troops (who were to be confined to base), and the withdrawal of SADF troops began seven months ahead of the elections. 164 Similarly, MINURSO's mandate in Western Sahara includes verifying Moroccan troop reduction and monitoring the confinement of Moroccan and POLISARIO troops to designated areas ahead of the self-determination referendum.
165 By contrast, in East Timor, Indonesia retained a military presence of an estimated 18,000 troops throughout the period of the popular consultation. 166 The second failing of the New York Accords was that there was no provision for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force to ensure security and monitor the vote. Rather, as we have seen, Article 1 of the Security Agreement, paradoxically, assigned responsibility for the security situation to the 'appropriate Indonesian 167 The explanation given by the Secretary-General was that Indonesia made it clear that 'it could not accept any dilution of its overall responsibility for security'. See 'Question of East Timor, Progress Report', supra note 119, at para. 11. 168 The Security Council Mission that was deployed in the immediate aftermath of the September 1999 violence reported that it was in no doubt that 'large elements' of Indonesian military and police authorities 'had been complicit in organizing and supporting the action of the militias'. authorities'. This is simply unfathomable. 167 As a matter of historical record, the Indonesian military's penchant for human rights abuse against the East Timorese had been matched only by its flagrantly pro-integrationist agenda. Although official confirmation 168 was lacking at the time of concluding the New York Accords, there was nonetheless a wealth of evidence 169 to support the claims of East Timorese and other observers 170 that the Indonesian military was responsible for the pro-integration militias, which, from January 1999, had been wreaking such havoc in the territory. In short -as borne out by the direct involvement of the Indonesian military and police in the September 1999 violence 171 -to assert the need for a security environment devoid of intimidation and violence, and then to assign responsibility for securing that environment to Indonesia, was positively oxymoronic. 172 Moreover, again it is out of step with United Nations practice in self-determination situations involving military occupation and armed conflict, which favours the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force to monitor the ballot. 173 In Namibia, for example, UNTAG included a 4,900-strong military contingent with a mandate inter alia to monitor the reduction of SADF, disarm militias and monitor the confinement of arms and ammunition. 174 peacekeeping force -far less to assign the principal security role to the 'appropriate' South African security authorities. Was there a principled basis for distinguishing the situation in East Timor? As international lawyers, how then do we respond to the news that the United Nations signed up to an agreement that was per se inimical to a free vote 'devoid of intimidation and violence'? Perhaps we focus on what actually happened: 98.6 per cent of registered East Timorese 175 turned out to vote and the day itself was relatively violence-free. 176 Are we post facto pragmatists who applaud 177 the bravery of the East Timorese who -like the United Nations Secretary-General -were clearly 'undeterred by the intimidation'?
178 Or do we reflect that given the consequences of a vote in favour of special autonomy within Indonesia -the removal of East Timor from the list of non-self-governing territories, its deletion from the international agenda 179 -it was simply unacceptable that a United Nations-sponsored ballot should be conducted under less than optimal conditions? The outcome of the vote was 78.5 per cent in favour of rejecting autonomy.
180 Do we celebrate the proindependence result, relieved that in the end there was no doubt that it reflected the 'genuine free expression of the will' 181 of the East Timorese people? Or, do we remind ourselves once again that self-determination is about process not outcomes, and that, in any event, to focus exclusively on the ballot result as the one 'happy ending' to the East Timor Story is distorting as it diverts attention away from the other -less happy -outcomes 182 on the ground. The violence that erupted on 3 September 1999 had been predicted by human rights groups and by the East Timorese as the inevitable consequence of the United Nations failure to secure Indonesian troop withdrawal or 183 The United Nations Secretary-General has stated that the United Nations anticipated 'some difficulties, some violence' but not the 'total and wanton destruction of everything in sight'. 188 For the view that East Timor had been a failure of politics rather than law, see Bowring, 'Self-Determination and the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice', in CIIR/IPJET, supra note 11, at 151. deploy peacekeepers. 183 The death of East Timorese and UNAMET personnel, the wholesale destruction of villages and towns, and the 'humanitarian catastrophe' of 250,000 East Timorese refugees are directly attributable to these failings of the New York Accords.
From Formalism to Pragmatism: Dispensing with Two Possible Defences
It can thus be seen that the New York Accords failed to provide for a free choice sufficient to comply with the international legal rules on self-determination as process. 184 As such, contrary to the standard account, it is my contention that they are more accurately viewed as a product of pragmatic compromise rather than any principled application of the rules on self-determination of peoples. 185 Yet perhaps as international lawyers we will only be comforted to learn that the East Timor Accords represented an abdication rather than an application of the international legal rules. Once it is established that the institutional move from the International Court of Justice to the United Nations was characterized by a shift from (legal) formalism to (more political?) pragmatism, could it not be argued that the burden of responsibility for 'what-went-wrong' also shifts -from law onto, say, politics? On this analysis, the New York Accords could be seen, not so much as a failure of law, but rather a failure to implement law.
One can imagine the following line of argument could be marshalled by international lawyers in defence of our discipline: the failure of the UN and Portugal to ensure Indonesian troop withdrawal or the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping troops under the terms of the New York Accords as required by law, was due to a lack of political will on the part of Indonesia and/or powerful/influential states 186 who were in a position to bring pressure to bear upon Indonesia. Similarly, the Security Council's eventual decision to deploy a multilateral force in accordance with international law (with Indonesian consent) was due to a change in the political will of Indonesia and/or those same key states (in turn, of course, brought about by the September violence and its extensive media coverage 187 ). Ergo, international law was no more than an innocent bystander at the Timorese slaughter.
188
In short, does not establishing that in the United Nations chapter of the East Timor Story there was a failure to comply with the rules on self-determination as process, merely serve to absolve international law of any responsibility for the catastrophic consequences of non-compliance?
Yet, even if we accept the existence of a discernible law/politics distinction, 189 it is unclear why the acts (or omissions) of the United Nations Secretary-General or Portugal acting in its capacity as Administering Power under Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter should be characterized as 'political' rather than 'legal' if the purpose is to remove the responsibility of the international legal order. To paraphrase Berman, politics cannot always give international law its alibi. 190 Rather, it is my contention that the failure to adhere to the strict letter of the law in the New York Accords should be viewed, not so much as some aberrational departure from international law, but as part of an unacknowledged trend within contemporary practice, which (selectively) favours pragmatic negotiation over formal legal entitlement -the all-important peace process over self-determination as process.
From the Middle East to the Western Sahara, peace processes are much in vogue. As the New York Accords demonstrate, however, for a people struggling for the right of self-determination the onset of a peace process may be paradoxical. On the one hand, the peace process may work hand in hand with the international legal principles, leading to the implementation of the legal rules on self-determination. On the other hand, the peace process may be invoked to trump rather than translate the legal framework. 191 Thus, once a peace process is in train, reliance by a people on formal legal entitlements may seem contrary to its pragmatic spirit, which tends to disavow predetermined outcomes in favour of negotiated settlement. Similarly, the peace process may serve to treat the parties as legal -and moral -equivalents, ignoring prior illegalities as much as prior entitlements. For example, since the signing of the Israel/Palestinian Declaration of Principles in 1993, 192 the Security Council has repeatedly failed to adopt resolutions on issues such as Israeli settlement activity, on the basis that this would be to prejudge issues reserved for the final status negotiations. 193 Similarly, Security Council resolutions endorsing the East Timor peace process in advance of the August 1999 popular consultation significantly omitted earlier injunctions in favour of East Timorese self-determination and Indonesian troop withdrawal. 194 The failure of the United Nations to comply with the international legal rules in the New York Accords thus flags up an issue of more general concern to the self-determination formalist: the potential for conflict between the commitment to a 'peace process' and the formal rules of international law. 195 Alternatively, however, perhaps among international lawyers, there are others who would view the departure from formal legal rules in the New York Accords as cause for celebration rather than consolation. Have we not already seen from the Case Concerning East Timor that the formal legal rules and structures are inhospitable to the claims of peoples struggling for the implementation of the legal right of selfdetermination? On this analysis, the adoption of a flexible, more pragmatic approach to nationalist conflict could be seen, not so much as a violation of peoples' rights, but rather as a welcome or necessary corrective to the statist strictures of the formal international legal order. 196 But, whatever the limitations of the existing legal structures, the moral of the East Timor Story is that the 'pragmatic' may be every bit as statist and procedurally exclusive of peoples as the 'formal'. Notably, there was no direct participation of the East Timorese leadership in the UN-sponsored peace process. 197 The signature of Xanana Gusmao or any other representative of the East Timorese people on the New York Accords is conspicuous only by its absence. 198 By contrast, Indonesia -the
